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Distribution of Incomes and Expenditures
WE TURN NOW to an analysis of the probable distribution of
the money incomes which will be generated by the military
and civilian production during the fiscal year 1943. Money
incomes as a whole have risen since the inception of the de-
fense program, not only as a result of the rise in the national
output, but also because of the advance in prices since May
1940. Further gains in total money incomes will take place
to the extent that the expected additions to the national out-
put are realized, and also so far as price levels continue to
advance.
From the standpoint of an analysis of the fiscal problems of
the government during the war, a knowledge of the probable
division of aggregate money incomes among broad income
receiving groups is of great importance. Thus, if we can
ascertain what income groups are likely to receive not only
the greatest share of aggregate money incomes but also the
largest proportion of the income increments during this
period we shall have a guide to taxation and borrowing
policies of prime significance. Just as the basic problem of a
major war effort is one of diverting real resources from ci-
vilian to military uses, the corresponding financial problem
is one of locating and transferring to the government through
appropriate fiscal action as large a proportion as possible
of those funds in the hands of civilians which might other-
wise cause dangerous and unnecessary competition for the
resources essential to the national war effort, and a harmful
inflation of prices.
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In this chapter we present first some estimates of approxi-
mate aggregate money incomes likely to be received by cer-
tain broad income groups. We then consider what share of
the aggregate money incomes received by each of the several
groups will tend to be spent on consumption, and what part
wiji remain for savings, gifts, and taxes.
The level of total money incomes discussed in this chapter
is the aggregate which we roughly estimate is likely to be dis-
tributed to individuals in the United States in the fiscal year
1943, provided inflationary tendencies are restrained. It is de-
rived from our estimate of gross national product in 1940
dollars, in the preceding chapter, at approximately $128 bil-
lion for the fiscal year 1943. By March 1942 prices as meas-
ured by the cost of living index had risen to a point 14 per
cent above the average for 1940. The highest prices reached
during this month were subsequently established as price
ceilings above which purchases and sales of most commodities
were prohibited. It is too early to judge how effective this re-
striction will be in preventing further price increases, but we
can be reasonably certain that average prices in the fiscal year
1943 will at least be no lower. If they should rise no further,
the gross national product, in dollars then current, would
approximate $146 billion, which would be equivalent to our
estimate of $128 billion in 1940dollars.
As explained in Chapter i, gross national product exceeds
net national income by the total of business taxes and the
aggregate allowance for depreciation, depletion, and certain
pther business charges. Deducting our estimate of $23 billion
for the former and $10 billion for the latter leaves $i 13
billion for net national income in the fiscal year 1943.Net
national income, in turn, exceeds total money incomes of
individuals, or national income paid out, by the amount, if
any, of aggregate corporate savings. Such savings were esti-
mated by the Department of Commerce at billionin
194', and we believe are likely to reach aboutbillion
in the fiscal year 1943. Making this final deduction, we arriveDISTRIBUTION OF INCOMES AND EXPENDITURES 53
at a rough estimate of $109 billion for total money incomes
of individuals in the fiscal year 1943. This figure is therefore
used as our estimate of probable money income distribution.
Broad averages and aggTegates alone are considered because
changes in individuals' incomes will not be uniform. The
incomes of some will increase sharply, while those of others
will rise little if at all, and some will actually decline. Never-
theless, the regularities in the distribution of incomes in
each of the last twenty years support our expectation that
the broad averages will move generally in the regular way
set forth below.
1 ESTIMATES OF INCOME DISTRIBUTION
Using the National Resources Committee studies of income
distribution and consumer expenditures in 1935—36 as a
base,' we have estimated incomes and consumer expenditures
by various income brackets that might be expected if, during
an ordinary peacetime expansion, aggregate money incomes
rose to $109 billion, as we expect they will in the fiscal year
1943. In our estimates of incomes by income brackets we in-
cluded the incomes of military personnel, but no specific al-
lowance was made in estimating numbers of consumer units
by brackets, to take account of expansion of the armed forces.
In preparing these estimates, we allowed for changes in
expenditure patterns caused by the substantial tax advances
between 1935—36 and 1941 on the assumption that consumers
respond to heavier tax liabilities as they would to comparable
reductions in their incomes. We did not, however, make any
specific allowance for changes in the price level or for lower
consumer expenditures because fewer goods are on the
market. That is, these estimates assume that all the goods
consumers would ordinarily want to purchase at the higher
levels of total money incomes would be available. We attempt
later in the chapter to make rough allowance for the shortage
of purchasable supplies.
Moreover, these estimates make no allowance for any54 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
changes in the way income was distributed between 1935—36
and1941, and that may occur between the calendar year
1941 and the fiscal year 1943. These actual and probable
shifts in income distribution are discussed later, and some
rough adjustments are made in our calculations to allow for
them.2
As money incomes rise, the number of families or units
having incomes at the lowest levels will decrease, while the
number at all higher levels will tend to increase, since more
families will be shifting from lower to higher levels than
from higher to lower, all along the line. We estimate that
when incomes reach $iog billion at least 6.7 million fewer
families will be earning less than $1,750 than was the case
in the fiscal year 1941 (Table
8
Estimates of Consumer Units and Incomes by Income Groups,
at Total Money Income Levels of $8i and $109 billion, and
Net Changes
CONSUMERUNITS CONSUMERINCOMES
(thousands of units) (billions of doflars)
Net Net
INCOME GROUP $8i $109Change $8i $109Change
Below $1,750 25,81719,079—6,738 24.6 19.4 —5.2
$1,75o-Io,000 14,90421,333+6,429 43.9 +25.4
Over $10,000 553 862+309 12.5 20.2 +7.8
Total 41,27441,274 0 8i.o 109.0+28.0
This decline in the number of units in the lowest group
will reduce sharply the aggregate incomes of those remaining
in the brackets making up this group. Our estimates suggest
that the aggregate incomes of all units with incomes below
$1,750 will be about $5.2billionless when income payments
reach $109 billion than at the level attained in the fiscal year
1941. On the other hand, the number of economic units in
the $1,75o-lo,000 group will increase 6.4 million, and total
incomes received by this group will be some $25.4 billionDISTRIBUTION OF INCOMES AND EXPENDITURES 55
higher. For the group receiving incomes in excess of $io,00o
the increase in aggregate incomes will be about $7.8 billion.
Therefore, the gain in the highest group will be only moder-
ately greater than the decline in the lowest group, while
the middle group will receive about 63 per cent of total
income payments made at this level and some 90 per cent
of the net increment in total incomes.
Changes in the Inequality of Income Distribution
As stated above, we made no allowances for shifts in distribu-
tion which would cause the higher income groups as a whole,
or the lower income groups as a whole, to show relatively
greater gains in money incomes. If the former occurs, the
tendency will be for the income distribution to become more
unequal; if the latter, the trend will be to a less unequal
distribution.
Since the first World War, there has been a tendency to a
more unequal distribution of incomes during periods of ris-
ing national output, although this tendency did not appear
in the recovery which followed the depression low of
In those years of expansion between 1932 and 1940, even
the years of highest national output seem not to have been
marked by greater inequality than prevailed in 1932. More-
over, during an intense war effort, special conditions are
likely to reverse the usual trend. For example, the distribu-
tion of income actually became less unequal in each of the
years 1917,1918,and 1919,despitean accompanying sharp
rise in prices, which usually tends to cause a more unequal
income distribution.5
Indications that the distribution of income has become less
unequal since the start of the defense program are abundant.
Since the summer of 1940wageshave been rising more rap-
idly than total consumer incomes, while dividends have
gained less than incomes as a whole. While national income
payments were i8 per cent greater in 1941thanin 1940,
wage payments rose 25percent and dividends only 6 per56 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL
cent.6 Further analysis of the wage trend reveals that total
payments to factory workers were 41 per cent greater in
1941 than in 1940, while total factory employment increased
i8.8 per cent.7 We continue to have a sellers' market for
labor, with wage rates almost certain to advance further under
union pressure in the absence of effective governmental re-
striction.
The heavy incidence of war taxation on corporate profits
will be an important factor in checking a further rise in
dividends. Whereas 245 large industrial corporations had
earnings before federal taxes i6o per cent greater in 1941
than in 1939, the corresponding gain in profits after taxes
was only 40 per cent.8 Another influence tending to limit
dividends still further is the widespread caution of business
executives. Corporations are maintaining unusually large
cash reserves for contingencies and are trying to keep them-
selves as liquid as possible for the postwar adjustments they
dread. These tendencies are almost certain to continue. That
their influences are already making themselves felt is reflected
in the difference in the gain in 1941 over 1940 in corporate
net profits retained and in dividends: 30 and 6 per cent
respectively.0
Since wages are paid largely to those in the lower brackets,
and dividends largely to those in the higher, the distribution
of income has been shifting in favor of those in the lower
brackets since the start of the defense program. The probable
continuation of the recent tendency of wages to rise rela-
tively to dividends will be a strong influence in the direction
of an even less unequal distribution of income. Although a
general rise in prices will tend to modify this result, it will
probably not be sufficient by the end of the fiscal year 1943
to effect a change in the recent trend. Unless price inflation
becomes very pronounced, we believe that any further shifts
are more likely to be in the same direction than in the re-
verse. Although we did not find it feasible to attempt a precise
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distribution, we believe they are likely to be sufficient to
necessitate some rough adjustments if the estimates in Table
8 are to be a reasonable approximation to the probable dis-
tribution in the fiscal year 1943.
Such a shift toward a less unequal distribution may be ex-
pected to change the pattern in a period of rising national
output. Aggregate incomes received by the group above
$10,000 will rise less sharply. than incomes as a whole, first,
because of smaller than average increases on the part of in-
come recipients already in this group; second, because fewer
will move up into the highest group from those below
$10,000.
The group below $1,750willshow income increments
greater than the average. As a result, substantial numbers
of such income recipients will move up into the next group.
The net effect on the aggregate incomes of this lower group
will be to accentuate the tendency shown in Table 8. There-
fore, the number of economic units remaining in this group
will decline, and in turn the aggregate incomes received by
the group will be smaller.
Conflicting tendencies will appear for the $1,75o-lo,000
group. The lower ranges of those already in this group will
show greater than average increases, while the upper ranges
will show smaller than average increases. On the other hand,
this middle group will gain in number both from those who
move up from the lower group and from the retention of a
greater than usual number of those who would ordinarily
move up into the group above $io,000. The net result will
be an increase in the aggregate income received by this
middle group equal to the combined losses of the group
above $io,ooo and that below $1,750.
The greatest percentage loss in aggregate income will
probably be suffered by the group above $io,ooo. As a rough
estimate, we believe this group may actually receive in the
fiscal year 1943aboutio per cent less than the estimate of
$20.2 billion in Table 8, or approximately $i8 billion. The58 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
group below $1,750 will probably lose somewhat less. On
the whole, we feel that the aggregate for this group may be
estimated also at $i8 billion against $19.4 billion shown in
Table 8. Since the aggregate income of the middle group
will benefit by the losses of the other groups, we arrive at an
estimate of about $73 billion for the $1,75o-lo,000 group,
compared with the total of $69.3 billion in Table 8.
2 DISTRIBUTION OF CONSUMER EXPENDITURES
As set forth in Table 9, the shifts in aggregate consumer ex-
penditures to be expected in an ordinary rise in income pay-
ments to the $109 billion level would be similar in direction
to the shifts in the distribution of total money incomes shown
in Table 8. Our estimates show that, at an income level of
$109 billion, all consumers with incomes under $1,750 would
ordinarily spend some billionless than the expenditures
of the larger number of economic units in this same group
TABLE 9
Estimated Aggregate Expenditures of Consumers by Income
Groups, at Total Money Income Levels of $8i and billion,
and Net Changes (billions of dollars)
NET
INCOME GROUP $109 CHANCE
Below $1,750 24.4 19.0 —5.5
34.4 52.5 ±18.1
Over$io,ooo 4.4 6.6 +2.3
Total 63.2 78.1 + 14.9
at the lower levels of the fiscal year 1941. Total expenditures
of the group above $io,ooo would be only a little more than
$2 billion greater than in 1941. On the other hand, the in-
crease in expenditures for the $1,75o-lo,000 group would
amount to about $i8 billion, as compared with a net gain
of some $14.9 billion for income recipients as a whole. Aggre-
gate expenditures of this middle group would amount toDISTRIBUTION OF INCOMES AND EXPENDITURES 59
about $52.5 billion, or some 67 per cent of all consumer
expenditures at this level of total income payments.
The figure of $78 billion in Table 9 is an estimate of total
consumer expenditures which might be expected if all wanted
goods were in ample supply at a level of $109 billion for
aggregate income payments. Our analysis in Chapter 2, how-
concluded that, under the special stringencies of the
war, total civilian consumption may actually amount to only
about billionagainst a gross national product of $128
billion, in 1940 dollars, if military outlays absorb half of the
total national product. If our fiscal and related policies suc-
ceed in restricting the rise in prices to about 14 per cent in
the fiscal year 1943overthe level of the calendar year 1940,
theabove estimate of billionin 1940 dollars would be
equivalent to. about $6i billion in the prices which would
prevail in the fiscal year This figure of $6i billion rep-
resents, therefore, our rough estimate of total civilian ex-
penditures on consumption in the fiscal year 1943interms
of prices averaging about 14percent higher than those of
1940.
The reader should bear in mind that this estimate of $6i
billion rests upon three separate assumed figures, any of
which may be in error: the size of the gross national product,
the total military outlay, and the estimated advance in the
price level. Unless appropriate fiscal and other policies pre-
vent substantial inflation, one or more of these assumptions
may be seriously in error; and correspondingly the estimate
of $6i billion for civilian expenditures may prove widely in
error. In other words, unless anti-inflationary measures are
vigorous and effective, the analysis of consumer incomes and
expenditures in this chapter will lose much of its realism and
much of its usefulness as a guide to financial policy.
We must now consider how this curtailment of supply may
be expected to modify the consumer expenditure patterns
described in Table9. If we could determine the distribution
of the expected curtailment among income groups, we would6o FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
have discovered how the current sacrifices incident to the
war will be divided.
In the absence of effective fiscal and related policies, short-
ages of goods without corresponding reductions in money in-
comes would lead consumers to bid against one another in an
effort to maintain consumption. This would drive up their
money expenditures, prices, and the dollar amount of the na-
tional income, but it would not permit them to avoid a reduc-
tion in their real consumption. If we succeed in preventing
such inflationary bidding, the dollar amount of spending for
goods in short supply will be reduced.
In general, the funds released because consumers are un-
able to purchase certain goods in which shortages exist will
not all be spent on commodities that are in ample supply.
Part will be spent in this manner, but a considerable pro-
portion will be available for savings and taxes. If we suppose
that the funds so released will be distributed among other
purchases in much the same way as additional income would
be distributed, we should expect that less than 6o per cent
of it would be spent on other goods and services. This sup-
position, however, does not allow for the closing up of
numerous attractive outlets for consumption and the result-
ing probability that a still smaller portion of the income
so released will actually be spent on consumption. Total con-
sumption will be pared when some goods are short, even if
all others are not.
Distribution of Demand for Certain Kinds of Goods
In Chapter 2 we noted that,, under the pressures of the war,
a rising consumer demand for durable goods is certain to
meet sharply restricted supplies, while more moderate short-
ages are likely in the other principal categories of civilian
consumption. As this analysis was based upon the demand
of the nation considered as a whole, we now proceed to
break down these aggregate figures into amounts likely to be
demanded by each income group.DISTRIBUTION OF INCOMES AND EXPENDITURES 6i
Among durable goods, where shortages have already be-
come acute and more are expected, we consider first house-
hold furnishings. Our estimates show that more than two-
thirds ofallpurchases of such articlesasrefrigerators,
washing machines, radios, and furniture at an income level
of $109 billion would normally be made by the $1,75o-lo,000
income group. As compared with purchases at the income
levels prevailing in the fiscal year 1941, the decline in pur-
chases of this type by the group below $1,750 would be some-
what greater than the increased amounts purchased by the
group above $io,ooo. We estimate that the normal increase
in purchases of household furnishings by the $1,75o-lo,000
group would be nearly io per cent larger than the total
increment for the country as a whole.
The burden of the curtailment in the supply of these
articles as a result of strict rationing will fall most heavily
on the lower and middle income recipients who would other-
wise be devoting a considerable proportion of their incomes
to the purchase of these goods. Inability of the lower income
recipients to get these goods will mean less than correspond-
ing increases in expenditures on other things, and wider
margins for savings and taxes.
Automobiles present a somewhat different picture. Our
estimates indicate that, with a rise in money incomes from
$8i billion to $ioq billion, expenditures of the group below
$1,750 Ofl automobiles (including repairs and maintenance)
would ordinarily decline only moderately less than the ex-
penditures by the group above $io,ooo would rise. As a con-
sequence, the gain for the $1,75o-lo,000 group would in
ordinary times be expected to amount on balance to virtually
the entire total expected increase of a little more than $i
billion. Our estimates also indicate that these middle groups
would in such times have spent nearly $5 billion, or nearly
three-fourths of the total for the country as a whole.
In view of the substantial wave of forward buying during
the first three quarters of 1941, we would not have expected62 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
new car purchases in 1942 or 1943 to rise above the high
levels of 1941, even if automobile production were not al-
ready curtailed. Independently of these special factors, how-
ever, a downturn in the usual three-year cycle of automobile
production and sales might have been expected.
Pressure for automobile purchases will become more severe
after the digesting period is over and replacement demands
swell. The absence of new production will probably be re-
flected in higher prices and smaller supplies of used cars.
It therefore seems likely that at least those at the bottom
of the income scale will be less able to purchase automobile
transportation. Those above the lowest income groups could
probably get adequate automobile services, either by using
their old cars longer than usual or by turning to used car
markets, if the availability of cars in running condition were
the sole factor. This situation, however, has been altered con-
siderably by the severe shortage of tires. A determined and
honest administration of the tire rationing program will
mean that the burden of restricted transportation is likely
to fall on all income groups. We therefore conclude that al-
though maintenance costs and purchase prices may be ex-
pected to rise substantially, total automobile expenditures
will decline considerably, most of the reduction probably
falling on consumers with incomes between $1,750 and
$10,000.
With regard to the other categories of consumer demand,
such as food, clothing, and services, our analysis in Chapter
2 showed that no substantial diversion to war production was
likely. We concluded that no material consumer sacrifices
in these lines seemed involved, except in certain foods, such
as some meats, dairy products, and fruits, and in silk, woolen,
and leather goods. As these shortages appear, the manner in
which the burdens are distributed among income groups
will depend on the efficiency and determination of rationing.
If the scarce goods are effectively rationed, the burden of
shortages will be well distributed along the income scale.DISTRIBUTION OF INCOMES AND EXPENDITURES 63
If, however, rationing is not adopted or is half-hearted, then
we expect that initially the heavier burden of using substi-
tutes will fall on the lower income groups, because others
will be willing and able to pay more if prices are allowed to
rise or because they will be given preferential treatment by
distributors if rationing is lax. In any event, to the extent
that substitutes are forthcoming, actual privation will be
avoided. The situation would be different, however, if prices
should rise substantially: the lowest income groups could
easily be forced to spend such a high percentage of their
meager incomes on food and clothing that little would re-
main for other types of goods.
Against this general background we are now ready to con-
sider the probable distribution, by income groups, of the
$6i billion which, if fiscal and other policies prevent in-
flation, we would expect to be spent on consumption by
civilians in the fiscal year 1943.Asalready pointed out,
when some goods become short, a considerable proportion of
the funds released will not be spent on other goods even if
they are abundant. Consequently, a lower than usual per-
centage will be spent by income recipients who bear the
brunt of the shortages in supply, and who, as we have seen,
are largely those with incomes between $1,750and$io,ooo.
Table 9 showed that this group would account, for $52.5
billion, or 67 per cent of total consumer expenditures under
ordinary conditions if money incomes totaled $109billion.
If we assume that the expenditures of this middle income
group will constitute the same percentage of the $6 ibillion
of total consumer expenditures expected at April 1942 prices
for the fiscal year 1943,theywill amount to billion.
Were no influence except short supplies involved, we
might reasonably expect a lower expenditure figure for this
income group. However, we must consider the shift in the
distribution of income. As indicated in Section i,webelieve
that the economic units in this middle group will be con-
siderably more numerous and their aggregate incomes almost64 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
$4 billion greater than suggested by Table 8. Since their
expenditures will of course be larger, some $42 billion may
be accepted as a reasonable rough approximation for the
fiscal year 1943.
As indicated above, the aggregate incomes received in the
fiscal year 1943 by the groups above $io,ooo and below
$1,750 are likely to be less than our estimates for an ordinary
period in which aggregate incomes rise to a level of $109
billion. This reduction should mean a greater than average
decrease in expenditures from the levels shown in Table io.
On the other hand, both groups will tend to resist strongly a
curtailment of expenditures, the top group because of sub-
stantial monetary reserves on which they can draw, and the
lowest group because such a large percentage of expenditures
are necessitous. On the whole, we believe that the expendi-
tures of both groups will decline moderately more than the
average for the whole economy, and, we roughly estimate
expenditures at aboutbillionfor the group above $io,000
in the fiscal year 1943, and at about billion for the group
below $1,750.
3 DISTRIBUTION OF THE EXCESS OF INCOMES OVER DESIRED
EXPENDITURES
Having considered the distribution of money incomes and
of the expenditures consumers make in normal times, we
analyze the funds they do not, even in ordinary times, spend
on goods and services—their savings and sums available for
gifts and taxes. Our estimates show that, with aggregate
comes of $109 billion and taxes at the 1941 rates, we could
ordinarily expect some $78 billion to be spent by consumers
on goods and services. The balance, abouti billion (Table
io), would accordingly be available for gifts,taxes, and
savings. The income group above $io,ooo would normally
have some $13.6billionexcess of income over desired con-
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have some $17 billion. The latter group would account for
about 56 per cent of the net increase in all such excess
income.
TABLE 10
Estimated Excess of Incomes over Desired Expenditures, by
Income Groups, at Total Money Income Levels of $8i and $109
billion, and Net Increases (billions of dollars)
NET
INCOME CROU1' $8i $109 INCREASE
Below $1,750 .2 .5
9.5 16.8 7.3
Over $io,ooo 8.1 13.6 5.5
Total 17.8 30.9 13.1
It must be reiterated that the above estimates are hypo-
thetical in that they assume a rise in money incomes under
peacetime conditions with no artificial shortage of supplies
and no drastic advance in prices. We have, however, already
seen that, under the exigencies of war, consumer expendi-
tures are not likely to exceed some $6i billion in the fiscal
year 1943 out of expected total money incomes of $109 bil-
lion, assuming fiscal and other policies that prevent a rise in
prices above the April 1942 level. The balance, $48 billion,
available for taxes and savings, compares with the $31 billion
which we have estimated above would be available in an
ordinary peacetime expansion to a money income level of
$109 billion.
We have pointed out that, because of shifts in the distribu-
tion of income and other influences, the patterns of income
distribution and consumer expenditures are likely to be some-
what different from those traced in Tables 8 and 9. These
estimated changes will modify in turn the distribution of
the excess of incomes above expenditures. In Table 1 1 we
summarize the results of this analysis. The estimates trace
roughly the probable pattern for the fiscal year 1943. Al-66 FISCAL PLANNING FOR TOTAL WAR
though obviously subject to wide margins of error, they
should be useful as a benchmark for the formulation of in-
telligent financial policies.
TABLE 11
Estimated Distribution of Consumer Incomes, Fiscal Year 1943
(billions of dollars)
TOTAL CONSUMER EXCESS OF INCOMES
INCOME GROUP EXPENDITURESOVER EXPENDITURES
Below $1,750 i8 15 3
$1,750-lo,000 73 42 31
Over $10,000 4 14
Total 109 6i 48
4 IMPLICATIONS FOR FINANCIAL POLICIES
As noted above, the validity of the foregoing analysis rests
upon assumptions which may prove seriously in error if sub-
stantial inflation is permitted to occur. If, however, anti-
inflationary measures are vigorous and effective, the figures
developed in this analysis may well prove to be at least ap-
proximately good predictions. Under such conditions, the
figures in Tablei 1have important implications for any
program which may be devised for financing the war:
i) A financial program which proposed to raise all, or even
most, of the vast sums of money required by the govern-
ment from those with incomes above $io,ooo could not
possibly succeed, even if all such incomes were confiscated.
2) Very substantial amounts, therefore, must be raised, by
taxation and borrowing, from the middle and lower in-
come groups.
3) An ideal financial program, designed to raise the neces-
sary funds and avoid inflation, would absorb through
taxation, and through direct and indirect borrowing, all
the surplus purchasing power in the hands of individuals
in excess of consumption expenditures compatible with
the most effective war effort.DISTRIBUTION OF INCOMES AND EXPENDITURES 67
4) Although achievement is certain to fall short of such an
ideal goal, nevertheless taxation and borrowing policies,
to be even reasonably successful, must be designed to ab-
sorb substantial percentages of the excess purchasing
power from all those income groups in which such excess
purchasing power will lodge.
5) An unfortunate, but apparently inevitable, consequence
of any adequate financial program will be to impose se-
vere hardships on people whose incomes do not rise with
the general increase in total money incomes. The so-called
'white collar' workers, whose salaries tend to be within
the middle and lower income brackets, and remain rela-
tively stable in a period like the present, will be especially
exposed to such hardships.
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